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Abstract 
Democracy in a state is possibly a gain to have the government that represents 
the whole citizens. But the main element of the democratic system is the ability of 
the governmental functions in the state to act properly in order to gain the citizen 
wants. The simulation presented in this paper shows how the rule-making, rule-
application, and rule-adjudication functions work such ways and how they work to 
have the public wants. The model is the second order feedback control dynamic 
system where the rule-making and rule-application function placed in the forward 
path and the rule-adjudication placed at backward path of the system. The rule-
making function assumed to be the function that accentuate the result of public 
inquiries and presented as a gain function. The rule-application and the rule-
adjudication are modeled as an exponential function which response is lowering 
the entropy of the disordered state conditions by the policies that output. The 
possible noise that came from the inability of the government system to work 
properly is also presented here. The government system that succeed the gain 
the same as the public wants is the optimum government that wanted to be 
achieved. 
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Today if we are talking about governmental issues and the institutions that 
constitute the government, we will never be able to avoid using the terms of 
democracy. Democracy has been inherent issue to be raised on the social and 
political interests. Is it true that “democracy” has become the final, ultimate, and 
highest culmination of the evolution of human civilization (Fukuyama:1992)? 
Democracy, liberalization, capitalism have been the properties of the 21st century 
and is it true that what we can do now is to polish the basic concept of democracy 
and liberalization to cope the local conditions in some pre-democratic countries? 
This has been the basic conception that established the spirit of oxidentalism that 
raised among the injection of orientalism perspectives within the globalization 
(Turner:1994). Democracy, liberalization have been too often being used for 
other needs of vested interests that always lack of justice that shall be gained 
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through democracy practically. This paper will not try to answer the question 
above, but to make other perspectives on how the main political powers in a 
nation-state shall be organized in order to gain justice.  
 
1. Basic Concept of Powers and State in Democracy 
The main background to birth the discourse of democracy was to avoid 
despotic nation-state, tyrannical government that oppresses the citizens. 
According to Montesquieu, there are three category of government, i.e.: the 
republican government (subdivided into democratic and aristocratic government), 
monarchic and despotic government (Montesquieu:1752 ch.2).  We will use the 
main concept of this separation of power in this paper with assumption that all of 
the states of government exist will always can be divided into these three 
categories of power. In practice, the government of states will always become the 
variety to the three kinds of power, but the implementation will not always into 
three institutions. Some of the states combine two or even three of the category 
of powers, but some other made some variation for example, separating one of 
the category become two or even more institutions in government. These facts 
depend upon the conditions of the state spatio-temporally and the situational 
arguments that raised beyond the needs of the state. 
The legislative power is the governmental power that enacts temporary or 
perpetual laws and amends or abrogates those that have been already enacted 
(Montesuiquieu:1752, ch.5). Moreover, the legislative will direct how the whole 
government shall be employed for preserving the community the whole citizens 
(Locke:1688 ch.12). The ideal condition for the legislative power is that the whole 
citizens should be seated in legislative power. But it is almost impossible to do 
that. Therefore, moderately the representations of the whole people shall be 
seated in the legislative power with some mechanisms to be made where the 
representatives decree their responsibility for the people their represented 
(Gunning:2000). In other words, the public citizen shall transact by their 
representatives what they cannot transact by themselves (Montesquieu:1752 
ch.5). 
The executive power is the governmental power that makes peace of war, 
leagues or alliances, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security 
and provides against invasions, and all transactions with all persons and 
communities as the representative of the state (Montesquieu:1752, ch.5, 
Locke:1688, ch.12). The executive power also shall be represented to a person, 
not too many of persons since the policies in this power shall be made need short 
of time to be made. Other reasons is because the executive power often need a 
deep comprehension for the policies, so that there must be a free situation for the 
executive power to act cooperation with the experts and the progress will be seen 
whether to be accepted or rejected by the legislative power. 
The judicial power is the power for punishment of the criminals, determines 
the disputes that arises between individuals (Montesquieu:1752, ch.5). In other 
words, the judicial power has the duty of arbitration, pronounces on special case 
and not upon general principles, and has the property of inability to act unless it 
is appealed to or until it has taken cognizance of an affair (Tocqueville:1840, 
ch.6). 
The three kinds of power will share the unity of the whole governmental 
power in a state. As once stated by John Locke, democracy has an important 
property to do with those powers, namely the separation of those three kinds of 
power. Associations or coalitions among those powers will tend to the condition of 
anti-democratic or even despotic, because: 
 
the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting 
force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is 
necessary there should be a power always in being, which should see to the 
execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative 
and executive power come often to be separated. (Locke:1688, ch.12). 
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Thus, Montesquieu even more deeply stated: 
 
there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and 
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject 
would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. 
Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence and 
oppression…  (Motensquieu:1752, ch.11). 
 
Henceforth, the three governmental powers shall never implemented in one 
hand of powers unless the state will fall into the despotism. All of this rule on the 
government implemented theoretically in the constitution of the state as the basic 
social contract between the citizen and the government. Therefore the 
constitution become the highest law in such a nation, and everything concerning 
the governmental system shall be realized by the constitution, otherwise the 
constitution is not complete and it will be the leak that to be the hole for despotic 
or even dictatorship government (Russell:2000).  
By this basic definitions we can obviously see that in the discourse of the rule 
of law, we simply say that in governmental institutions can be classified in three 
kinds of functions i.e.: rulemaking function that represented by the legislative 
power, rule-application function that represented by the executive power, and the 
third, rule-adjudication function that taken by the judicial power (Bloch:1986). In 
this paper and so forth we will use these terms, as the model we present here we 
will made in function of law-production. 
In advance, we will use this basic of thinking to build up a model of the 
government, and we will see how the institutionalized powers interacting each 
other to run the government office in mathematical model. 
 
2. Building The Model  
We build the model based on the fact that the three governmental functions 
interact among them in the rule of law perspective. Therefore, we will see how 
the three functions concerning to their action in the law perspective. We will try to 
model the action of each institution in their effort to achieve their each aim in the 
perspective of the law abiding.  
The rule making function, as the legislative institution, can be seen as the 
function to make translations of what the citizen wants to the law-language. In 
other words, the rule making function is to accentuate the aspiration to the words 
of law. Here the duty of the legislative will depend on the public inquiry in order 
to have the simple points of what the people wants. By this, we can say that the 
response function of the legislative as a gain function: 
 
DL(t) = α, 
 
where DL is the entropy of what people wants and α is the coefficient that 
represents the ability to accentuate the citizen’s aspiration; the bigger α the more 
public aspiration can be translated into the rule of governance.  
In other hand, the rule application function can be seen as the ability of the 
executive institution to interpret the rule of governance made by the rule-maker. 
Thus, the rule application can be modeled as the function for the application and 
implementation of the rule that made by the legislative parts. In this case, the 
application can be seen as execution of policies in the citizen area – how to order 
and  manage the state from the big entropy into the lowest entropy as well as 
stated by the rule-makers. Here, we can picture this function as an exponential 
function,  
DE(t) = exp(-βt), 
 
where DE is the response of the rule-application function that try to lower the 
entropy of what people wants in executive or application manner, and β is the 
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coefficient of the acceleration of the rule application to be established. It is 
obvious that  
0)(lim =∞→ tDEt  
 
and the bigger the β the faster the functions accomplished. 
The function of rule adjudication can be seen also in this view. The function is 
to become the arbitrary function on any disputes. Thus, this function is to lower 
the entropy of the condition of the system. Here, we can make up  
 
DJ(t) = exp(-γt), 
 
Where DJ is the response of the adjudication function. And so forth, γ is the 
coefficient of the function to be accelerated. While,  
 
0)(lim =∞→ tDJt  
 
and the bigger the γ the faster the functions accomplished. 
We can see obviously how this components establish the dynamic feedback 
control system. Figure 1 shows the outlined model of the relation that established 
the dynamic feedback control. By the figure we can see that we have some 
signals of law that apprehended by the functions of each elements. The signals 
can be describe below,  
 
Pin  ≡ process of inquiring to people wants. The process here can be 
done by the elections, polling, referendum, mass-media, public-
demonstrations, intelligence services, et cetera. In short, this is the 
outcome of the whole process to inquiry what people want the 
government to do. 
 
PL  ≡ laws enacting according with considerations on what people want 
and some input from the arbitration process. The output procedures can 
be:  
9 making a new law/rule  
9 amending the old one rules/laws  
9 abrogating the old one rules/laws. 
The whole data from the inquiring process must be digested well by the 
representatives in order to have laws to be reinforced reflecting the 
needs and the people want. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PE  ≡ laws to be applied into public policies. This is the rule-making 
function of legislative body. They also become the input or the main 
Rule 
Making 
Function 
Rule 
Application 
Function 
Rule 
Adjudication 
Function 
Pin Pout 
PL PE 
PJ 
Figure 1 
Modified feedback control as a model of governmental powers 
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guidance for the executive in their duties as rule-application function of 
government. 
 
Pout ≡ public policies concerning governmental issues and state’s 
resources. This is the policies and the central management process of a 
state or a country. The face of the country will be mostly affected by the 
policies that enacted by the executive. 
 
Formally, the analytical functions refer to each power can be stated as: 
Legislative process : PL  Æ PE + XL 
Executive process : PE Æ Pout + XE 
Judicial process : XL + XE Æ PJ 
Or mathematically: 
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while DL(s), DE(s), and DJ(s) are DL(t), DE(t), DJ(t) respectively after the Laplace 
transform. 
 
The PL can also be written as (Pin – PJ), as the input for the legislation process 
must concern to the inquiring public needs and wants but also the arbitration on 
possibility of conflicts amongst the whole citizens that soluted by the judicial 
power of the state. 
XL and XE are some uncoped aspects that possibly comes out from the 
inefficiency of the body, some noise that can be apprehend as disturbances on 
the process of legislation or executions. These aspects mostly become the sources 
of disputes or conflicts amongst citizens, amongst the representatives in 
legislative body, citizens (possibly NGOs as extra-parliamentary power) to the 
executive body, or even the whole governmental system. 
By now then, we can have the feedback control system of the governmental 
system as described in figure 2. In advance we will use this model the conditions 
that may appear and how the response of the system simulated to cope such a 
condition. 
At a glance, it is obvious that our model turns out to be the simple 2rd order 
control system. We can see that the transfer function of the whole system turns 
to be: 
 
 = Transfer_Function α
( ) + β s ⎛⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟ + 1
α
( ) + β s ( ) + s γ  
where each α, β and γ shall be made upon some degree of each elements to work 
out.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2 
The 2nd order dynamical feedback control system that represents the 
interactions among powers in a state.  
α )(
1
β+s
)(
1
γ+s
Pin Pout 
PL PE 
PJ 
+ - 
 6
 
 
 
 
The good combination among the values of α, β and γ, will bring the system to the 
more effective of the outputs of the governmental system. We must remember 
here that even while the α, β, and γ is very big that represented each elements 
works as fast as possible, the system will not even give the expected results. The 
way of our simulation will gain the answer key on this combination. 
 
3. Simulation Results 
In this section, we will analyze the response of the whole system with some 
conditions that will reveal computationally some aspects of the governmental 
system that usually has been taken for granted by the qualitative analysis, and 
become the evolution of democratic system that we have now. This analysis will 
be also hoped to make us the ability to measure the effectiveness of some 
governmental system that we have in reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the first example, we will have a kind of condition while the value of 
α=β=γ=1. Figure 3 shows the response system for this situation. In this case, we 
can see that while the input of what people wants is in the state of 1 (step 
function), the output policies is by only 0.5 in the steady state condition. 
Moreover, in the first 4 time-sequence the system is attracted to be oscillation 
with the maximum overshot is 0.6.  
This example reflects that the governmental interactions are not in maximum 
optimization henceforth, the step-response we propose here is the situation of 
one-round game and while the system is in the constant state of conditions we 
will see the state-response that figured. However, the system should be evolved 
dynamically every round of game and the system should be more dynamical in 
practice until the steady state output gets the same state-value with what the 
citizen wants. 
Now we will see how the system of governance will response while the γ=β=1 
and varied values of α. Figure 4a showed how the system of government will be 
more and more optimum the bigger the value of α. While α=10, the system will 
be in under-damped dynamical control system wile in the first 6 time-sequence 
the response oscillated around the fixed-points of 1, while the same value of the 
Figure 3 
The response of governmental system while α=β=γ=1. The y-axis is the state condition of policies while 
the x-axis is the time. We can see that while the input of what people wants is in the state of 1 (step 
function), the output policies is by only 0.5 in the steady state condition. Look that in the first 4 time-
sequence the system is attracted to be oscillation with the maximum overshot is 0.6. We must be 
presumed that what pictured here is a one constant round game and the system will be in the steady-state 
while the state of conditions are constant. 
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step-response the people want it to be. By this fact, we can somehow say that 
the system will in more effective way while the value of α=10, β=γ=1. The more 
high value of α, the more effective the way system of governance goes. In 
reverse, the lower value of α, the more the system damped, and by this 
conditions we will hope that the elements of the system of governance will co-
evolve such a way until the expected value of the output can be reached. 
Concerning the meaning of α as the coefficient that reflected whether the rule 
made in appropriate acceleration or not thus, qualitatively we can say that the 
system of governance will be much more efficient while the legislative can make 
the translation of what the public wants faster.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the other hand, the slower work of the rule application relative to the value 
of α - the work on the rule-making process- will make the system more efficient. 
In figure 5 (a and b), we can see that the system of governance will brings the 
steady state response approximately valued 1 just the same with the public want 
it to be while β=0.05. In this case we can see that the response will be oscillated 
at the first 8 time-sequence – while this also occurs in every value of β. It is 
apparent that the system in varied values of β made not as many oscillations like 
the varied values of α. Qualitatively, we can say that this occurs because α is the 
coefficient of the acceleration of rule-making process, the accentuation on the 
result of public inquiry, while β is the acceleration of how fast the rule is applied. 
Hence, we can say that the acceleration of the rule-application must “wait” the 
rule making process. The system of government response will be much more 
depend upon how the rule made. That is why the figure 5b is much smoother 
relative to the figure 4b. 
Apparently, in the varied values of γ, while α=β=1 as we can see in figure 6, 
the more effective (high value of γ) the works of rule adjudication, the better the 
performance of the whole system.  But something different here is that the better 
the rule adjudication, the system is not oscillated. 
Qualitatively it is obvious. The work of rule-adjudication is to damp all of the 
disputes on the governmental system by arbitration. Henceforth, the better the 
   α=0.05  α=.5  α=1  α=5  α=10 
 (a)       (b) 
Figure 4 
The more value of α - that means the faster of the work of the legislative making 
the rule - will brings the governance system into the more efficient work of the 
rule applications. The small value of α made the system of governance to have 
over-damped response output. The over-damped response system has the steady-
state in value of the state around 0.01 and either the system not oscillated. 
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rule-adjudication process, the system will be damped more. We can see this by 
the concave graph presented in figure 6b. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The noise in the governmental system 
The model we presented above is in the condition where there is no 
disturbance on the system of state that Montesquieu and Locke defined ideally. In 
some countries, there are some possible disturbances on the ideal system 
(Jacoby: 1985, Berg: 1987). For example, the possibility of military forces in the 
political area as we can say it in the military regime, the possibility of the 
corruption in the body of the state or even in the body of judicial elements, i.e.: 
judges, police officers, etc. 
β=10 
β=5 
β=1 
β=0.5 
β=0.05 
  (a)      (b) 
Figure 5 
The response while α=γ=1 with varied values of β. The more value of the acceleration 
of execution or the application of the rule, the more efficient the works of the whole 
governmental system. 
γ=0.05 
γ=0.5 
γ=1 
γ=5 
γ=10 
  (a)      (b) 
Figure 6 
The response of the governmental system while α=β=1 in varied values of γ. It is 
obvious here the better the work of  rule-adjudication, the system will be much 
more damped. The damped system of the disputes is projected by the damped 
system response. 
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They are called the disturbance of the running government that ordered to 
serve the citizen. In our simulation, these possibilities can be assumed as a noise. 
A noise is the disturbance that bothers the elements of the system that even can 
bother the whole government system. Here, we use the band-limited white noise 
that generated randomly.  
From the figure 7 we see how the government system disturb by such a noise 
that bother the legislative or the executive system. In control simulation, we 
place the noise generator before the rule-making or the rule-application function. 
By the figure we see that the response system become absurd, kind of chaotic 
response that reflected how the government will perform on the inability of the 
rule-making to aspirated the citizen’s want or while the executive does not work 
properly. The signal presented in this condition will not make the public policies 
upon the public inquiries. Such a condition can turns in some despotic or dictator 
regimes.  The use of the military forces in order to force the authoritarian or 
totalitarian regime can also projected such conditions (Arendt: 1960, p.392-393). 
The response of the system can still saw oscillated somehow but not oscillated in 
the fixed points that wanted by the citizen’s wants (in the step response on value 
1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The judicial system of government is the most importance elements in 
government, especially in the democratic system of governance (Bloch: 1986). 
The figure 8 shows the governmental system in the malfunction of the rule-
adjudication. This is done by placing the limited-band white-noise at the 
backward path in the control system. We can see that the system become totally 
far from the how the citizens want it. The response system pictures that the 
governmental function become absurd so far henceforth the fail of the rule-
adjudication function can be a fatal in a country: a country without justice in it.  
However the corrupt dictatorship power in the state will gains the response 
system that much far from that the government should be. Figure 9 shows such a 
condition while all of the governmental elements are to be disturbed by the noise. 
The people can be forecasted to be stateless and henceforth cannot believe the 
government system. This is the utmost condition where the government is in a 
very far gap with the whole people. The response is chaotic and projects the 
situation where the whole states and citizens are restless. Probably, this is the 
condition where the governmental system in the despotic conditions as stated by 
Montesquieu once. 
 
Figure 7 
The governmental response function on the placement of noise at the forward path of the control 
dynamic system. This can reflected the absurdity of government that cannot projected the public 
wants. 
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5. Further works 
The simulations of the governmental model presented here are showed some 
conditions that so probable in our real world in many countries. However the 
paper shall be far away from the judgement of some countries that exists. Further 
works can be gained by practical research in some countries and made the scaling 
of the α, β, and γ therefore we can make a scientific judgement whether the 
governmental powers in a state have been good enough reflecting the citizens or 
not. It is obvious that the perfect response comes from the democratic system of 
governance as stated qualitatively by the classical works of Montesquieu and John 
Locke. But there will be no closed possibility that such a conditions can came from 
the government that not built from the democracy, but the functional elements 
i.e.: rule making rule adjudication, and rule application work in the proper way as 
simulated above. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
The governmental step response that turns out by placing the noise in the backward path 
of the control system.  
Figure 9 
The response system where the whole elements of the government are disturbed by 
the noise become despotic. The chaotic signal reflects the restless conditions that 
appear in the whole state. 
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6. Conclusion  
Government system of a state can be seen as a feedback dynamic control 
system, where the rule-making and the rule-application function placed as plants 
in forward path of the system and the rule-adjudication placed in the backward 
path. The system of governance can be said to be reflected the citizens as long as 
the system can be optimized to have:  
1
)(
)( ≈
∞→ tP
tP
out
in
t
Lim , 
in a steady state response. 
This can be achieved by setting the coefficients of each elements of the 
governmental system, i.e.: the coefficient of the acceleration of the rule-making 
process (α), the coefficient of the rule-application function (β), and the coefficient 
of the rule adjudication function (γ). The value of the α, β, and γ shall be made  
such a way that the response system can gained damped solution in the steady 
state. While this situation cannot be achieved properly, the government system 
will be unstable and cannot reflect the citizens and badly can bring the society of 
the state to become restless public. 
The despotic government system can come while the plants of the control 
system are disturbed by the noise that possibly can come from some negative 
aspects of the government. Qualitatively this can come from the corrupt 
elements, the authoritarianism using military forces, et cetera. However, the 
most important thing in the public area is the guarantee for justice. Henceforth, 
any disturbances in judicial elements of a state will turns the system in-
comprehensively. While this is happen the system of governance will loose the 
teeth for the justice and can be very dangerous to the sustainability of the 
regime. The backward plants of the control system government must be set to 
have the fully damping any disputes that come from anywhere of the state. 
Rationally we can say that the most important thing in governmental system is 
the rule of the law in the state.  
The democratic system of a state will brings a good response step in a nation, 
where the elements of the government will always be able to co-evolve such way 
to represents the citizens. The separation of the powers, minority rights, the civil 
society above the military forces, et cetera. However, we will not closed any 
possibility that a non-democratic system can gain such a good government that 
can be able represent the citizens. But still, the element functions of power must 
obey such conditions that presented in the simulation above. 
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